Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO THE DESTRUCTION AND REMEDIATION OF NON-STOCKPILE CHEMICAL MATERIEL: CAN PRESENT POLICY AND APPROACHES EFFECTIVELY MEET THE CHALLENGES TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT TO THE PUBLIC?
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) states that as part of a comprehensive strategy to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) the U.S. must develop "… strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction." 1 The NSS specifically addresses the need to enhance arms control and threat reduction capabilities as components of the strategy. developed a significant capability to design, produce and stockpile chemical warfare materiel.
The country continued to expand its capability and effectiveness of these weapons until 1968
when President Nixon issued an executive order to unilaterally stop the production of weapons in the U.S. By that time the U.S. had produced a staggering array of agents, munition types, and delivery systems in large stockpiles. 5 Since 1968 the U.S. has sought to eliminate both its own Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) and that of other states.
The presence of CWM in the U.S. became an intense topic during the 1970s and 80s.
Congress's perception that DOD was not adequately addressing the destruction of this materiel resulted in a number of legislative attempts to address the issue. In support of its' national interests, the U.S. is pursuing three broad ends. The first is the destruction of stockpiled weapons and materiel in the U.S. and abroad. This category includes unitary weapons that were placed in weapons inventories of the military. Additionally, containerized supplies of useable weapons grade material are included in this category.
Stockpiled CWM is the most readily usable as terrorist weapons because they are already in a useable configuration and would require little technical skill to use in a strike.
The second is the elimination of former production facilities in the U.S. and abroad. The intent is to simply destroy the capability to produce weaponized CWM. This prohibits the spread of the problem and is important for counter-proliferation efforts.
The third end is the elimination of RCWM. This is the broadest set of problems, encompassing a variety of items including unexploded munitions fired in training, chemical samples used in research and development facilities, and live agent training aids used through out the U.S. The terrorist attacks on 9 September 2001 combined with administration and congressional concern with the possible use of WMD by terrorists significantly increased the desire to protect the American public by eliminating the presence of chemical materiel here and abroad. 10 
NON-STOCKPILE CHEMICAL MATERIEL (NSCM) SCOPE
The scope of the RCWM problem is not fully quantified in the U.S. 13 The • Binary chemical weapons. These weapons were designed to be safer to store, transport and use. They became toxic only after firing or launch.
• Former production facilities. The sites that produced agents, munitions, or critical components of each.
• Miscellaneous CWM. CWM items that are not part of a munition.
• Recovered CWM. Items of all types discovered throughout the country Such items were routinely shipped without bursters or fuses. An example of this category is a World War II era mustard bomb recovered from a burial site.
• Explosively configured chemical munitions. These are munitions with at least part of the explosive material sealed inside and an external fuse. An example of this category is a fused 155mm projectile recovered from a firing range.
KEY ORGANIZATIONS
The U.S. has committed significant effort using several elements of National Power to eliminate CWM. DOD is the executive agent for all destruction efforts in the U.S. as well as participating in arms control and providing military assistance for civil authorities for technology/equipment and emergency response. 
Prior to emergency destruction, if time permits, the Army Safety Office and the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health) must be notified. In accordance with public law, Congress must be notified of the destruction within 48 hours. 18 For planned site investigation and assessment activities, Major Army Commandapproved site-specific safety and health plans are required. Remediation projects require safety submissions approved by the Army Safety Office. Typically, emergency exercises with the U.S.
Army and local agencies involved in or supporting these activities must be successfully conducted prior to starting any actual work. Sampling plans to determine the chemical agent contamination of surrounding soil, air, and water are required for both emergency response and planned activities. These requirements, along with federal and state environmental requirements, govern the response to the discovery of (buried) non-stockpile chemical materiel.
The speed with which an emergency response or planned activity can be initiated and accomplished depends on the level of cooperation realized between all the organizations involved and the promptness with which they each accomplish their assigned responsibilities.
When suspected CWM is uncovered; assessment and characterization of the suspect munition is conducted by the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit operating assessment system for PM NSCMP. When a recovered munition is characterized as CWM, NSCMP evaluates the findings and performs the proper method for treating and disposing of the munition in a safe, environmentally sound, and cost effective manner. Additionally, the NSCMP prepares and coordinates transportation plans, interim holding facility plans, and destruction plans. Once approvals are received, the destruction of the recovered CWM is normally conducted onsite, especially if recovered CWM is deemed too hazardous to transport.
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ISSUES PREVENTING COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS
A comprehensive approach to resolving the problem is not executable under the present DoD approach to the issue. Detailed planning, prioritization and budgeting is hampered by a number of disconnects.
Defining the problem would require a significant scoping study that includes DOD installations (all components), FUDS, BRAC and other sites. No organization has authority over all types of locations and associated planning, programming and budgeting activities. This lack of common direction severely impedes scoping studies that would support a prioritization effort across DOD.
After a comprehensive site analysis is completed the single largest cost driver to estimate the true scope of any remediation project is the anticipated end use of the property. End use is not dictated by DOD but must be coordinated with and approved by local and state authorities. 
25
The GAO noted that the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) had, so far failed to issue directions to the service component to develop and prioritize a schedule for remediation of all CWM burial sites. 26 While the Secretary of the Army has assigned responsibility for cleanup of FUDS sites covered on the DERA program to the USACE, they reported their efforts were is a preliminary stage of determining the process. They were performing site surveys to determine the scope and magnitude of seven burial sites. This effort, still in its infancy compared to the 153 FUD sites, it does not include assessment for sites on active installations, BRAC or other service component locations.
CONCLUSION:
The U.S has taken significant steps to achieve the desired ends with reference to the elimination of CWM. While progress has been significant there exist several disconnects that will significantly hinder attainment of the desired ends.
The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel portion of the program, specifically RCWM and burial sites present many challenges that the current DOD approach does not address. PM NSCM develops technology and staffing to execute emergency response for discovered CWM.
Crewed equipment exists to safely destroy all materiel likely to be found within the U.S. The final mission for the NSCM program is the destruction of RCWM. 27 There is the risk that the public can inadvertently discover training material and unexploded ordnance that can and has resulted in injury. Since 9/11 concern has grown about the possibility that terrorists could obtain CWM from these sites. Due to the cost of remediation of this problem; $8.9 billion in 1996 and by some estimates $20 billion dollars today. DOD decided to accept risk by focusing on the stockpile portion of the elimination effort and address the RCWM issue in the future. 28 DOD while recently increasing scoping study efforts does not have a developed plan to address the RCWM problem. Additionally DOD has no central activity to organize or prioritize the effort. Public pressure has dramatically increased congressional interest in the DOD approach to the RCWM effort. GAO reported "…several changes in the organizational and structure of the program from 1997 through 1999, including some changes to implement legislative requirements, divided the management roles, responsibilities, and accountability among several different management levels with the DoD and the Army. As the program expanded beyond its original single purpose of destroying the stockpile to encompass a broader range of missions, to include compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the organization and structure became increasingly complex". 29 The GAO reported that the complexity of this structure was leading to failures in the plan to eliminate CWM.
The challenges in the current strategy represent significant risks to the achievement of the desired ends. The decision to delay addressing the RCWM issue into the future in light of 9/11 is no longer suitable. Increasing awareness of the potential hazards of this materiel will continue to generate increasing congressional and public pressure to address the issue.
Elimination of CWM is a vital interest to the U.S. The significance is clearly articulated in both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Both public and congressional pressures are building to quickly and effectively destroy CWM at home and abroad. Congressional interest in resolving the CWM issue is easily demonstrated by more than 30 years of legislating direction to the DOD for the destruction of this materiel. In fact, the Congress has provided direction to the DOD through legislation that forced the department to begin addressing the issue. The U.S. has achieved great strides in achieving its ends to eliminate these materials, but the issues have evolved since the original policy was put in place. The present state of the issues requires that the means must be adjusted to support the ways to achieve those ends. Without adjustment, the U.S. risks the failure to achieve its ends with the result that the public remains exposed to the risks of CWM.
An uncoordinated approach simply will not resolve the problem and allows the costs of solving the issue to grow each year while doing little to eliminate the risk to the public.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. In order to comprehensively address the RCWM issue, DOD must develop the strategic vision and policy direction required to scope, prioritize, budget and execute a RCWM plan. DOD direction must require the various DOD components to schedule the quantification and remediation of the buried sites across all service components and agencies. Implementing these recommendations is critical to structuring an executable program to address the non-stockpile CWM issues. These recommendations are the key to logically addressing Congress's questions and the public concerns in a timely manner. Failure to implement a comprehensive solution leaves the risk of inadvertent exposure unmitigated.
Program costs will continue to grow due to the increased urbanization of these sites and increasingly stringent cleanup goals demanded by local governments. Further failure to implement a DOD approach merely delays the inevitable demand from Congress that DOD resolve these issues.
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